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Abstract: The proliferation of distributed generation and the electrification of heat and transport pose significant challenges to
distribution system operators (DSOs), and transmission system operators (TSOs). These challenges include the choice between
network upgrades or operating increasingly constrained networks, with a reliance on the flexibility of distributed energy resources
(DERs). This paper presents a novel market based coordination scheme, which allows both the DSO and TSO to access DER
flexibility, while respecting distribution system limits. The DSO’s objective in this work is to minimise the cost incurred by DSO
adjustments to DERs, required to ensure stable distribution network operation. The methodology presented has the advantages of
being compatible with existing TSO balancing market operation, and scalable enough to include multiple DSO markets coordinating
with the TSO. The approach is demonstrated on a section of GB distribution network, using high DER growth scenario data for
the year 2030. The case studies demonstrate the proposed DSO market mechanism to maintain thermal and voltage limits during
periods of peak demand and DER output. The DSO is given priority in using DERs to solve distribution network constraints,
however, significant flexibility remains for the TSO even during periods of peak demand and maximum export.
Nomenclature
Sets
D set of demands
G set of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
L set of lines
B set of buses
Indices
d demand
g DER
b bus
LB, UB lower bound, upper bound
L line
T transmission
bb′ from bus b to b′
Parameters
P, Q active, reactive power set points
C↓, C↑ cost to turn down, turn up
V Value of lost load
G line conductance
B line susceptance
S apparent power
PT transmission import/export
Variables
p, q active, reactive power dispatch
p↓, p↑ downward, upward re-dispatch from DER set-point
v voltage
θ voltage angle
pD demand delivered
Acronyms
ACOPF, AC Optimal Power Flow; ANM, Active Network Man-
agement; BM, Balancing Mechanism; BRP, Balancing Responsible
Party; BSP, Bulk Supply Point; CR, Community Renewables; EV,
Electric Vehicle; DER, Distributed Energy Resource; DG, Dis-
tributed Generation; DSR, Demand Side Response; FES, Future
Energy Scenarios; GB, Great Britain; GSP, Grid Supply Point; NLP,
Non-linear Programming; STOR, Short Term Operating Reserve;
TSO, Transmission System Operator; T&D, Transmission & Dis-
tribution; WPD, Western Power Distribution.
1 Introduction
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), including PV, wind, CHP,
biomass, energy storage systems and Electric Vehicle (EVs), will
play a key role in the decarbonisation of the electricity supply. It
is anticipated that up to 45% of total generation capacity in Great
Britain (GB) will be connected within distribution networks by
2030 [1]. In recent years, aggregators have taken an increasing role
in accessing the flexibility of DERs, including offering ancillary
services (e.g. Short Term Operating Reserve and Firm Frequency
Response) to the Transmission System Operator (TSO) [2]. In addi-
tion, aggregators entered the GB balancing mechanism, in August
2018, with accepted balancing volumes rising steadily since (see
Figure 1).
As the capacity of DERs increases in constrained areas of net-
work, system limits (e.g. thermal, voltage and fault current) could
become a barrier to the amount of flexibility offered by DERs. Active
network management (ANM) schemes are a first step towards man-
aging associated network constraints, however, generators may be
discouraged by uncertain return on their investments if they enter a
non-firm ANM contract [4, 5]. Market based ANM schemes have
been proposed [6] as a solution to improve investment certainty, but
still lack adequate coordination with the TSO.
Distribution System Operator (DSO) markets have been proposed
[7], and are being trialled [8], as a method of managing distribution
constraints. DSO markets can be for the procurement of flexibility or
ancillary services at distribution level, which could include a region,
a grid supply point or a section of distribution network. The DSO
market provides a mechanism to reward DERs for providing flex-
ibility to relieve distribution system constraints, and will improve
incentives for investment in DERs. DSO markets can be consid-
ered an evolution of current ANM schemes by adding a market layer
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Fig. 1: Cumulative accepted balancing volumes of select aggregator balancing
mechanism units (BMUs), August 2018 to January 2019; data: [3]
.
to the ANM’s control layer. Figure 2 illustrates the transition from
passive networks, via ANM schemes, to DSO markets with the cor-
responding increases in capacity limits, metering/communication,
modelling complexity, and levels of DSO-TSO coordination. These
increases would incur a cost which would be compared to traditional
network reinforcement (and passive network operation). The cost-
benefit of ANM has been proven during trials [9, 10], and has since
been widely applied to constrained regions of GB distribution net-
works. The cost-benefit of DSO markets, with some of the additional
requirements shown in Figure 2, is being assessed in trials taking
place across GB (e.g. [8] [11]).
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Fig. 2: The evolution from passive distribution networks and ANM to DSO markets.
The DSO-TSO coordination scheme proposed, provides a tool in the transition from
passive networks to the DSO market place, which would enhance utilisation of DERs.
Although DSO trials are taking place in GB, it is not yet clear
how access to DERs will be coordinated between the DSO and TSO.
It is widely accepted that there is a need for coordination between
transmission and distribution (T&D) markets, to give the most effi-
cient use of DERs, and to prevent conflict between the TSO’s and
DSO’s objectives [4, 12, 13]. The problem of TSO-DSO interaction
is an active area of research and the existing literature is compared in
detail with the authors approach in Section 2. Models have been pro-
posed for TSO-DSO coordination [13–15], however there is limited
demonstration on test networks to validate them. The timescales and
interactions for DSO and TSO markets hav not been established and
a viable method is yet to be demonstrated based on any detailed mod-
elling. This paper builds on the existing literature by demonstrating
a framework for DSO markets to coordinate with the existing TSO
balancing markets. In this work, consideration has been given to the
scheduling of DSO and TSO markets, specifically the DSO market
running ahead of the TSO market, which has not been considered in
literature to date. Detailed studies have been carried out on a section
of GB distribution network.
The proposed method fits broadly into the ‘common DSO-TSO
market’ model from [13]. It has the advantage over the DSO provid-
ing prequalification for a centralised TSO market, in that dynamic
compensation for DERs, which are limited in their participation in
the TSO market as a result of distribution network constraints, is
provided. It also has advantages over the local market model as the
DSO does not need to aggregate DERs. A disadvantage with the pro-
posed method could be that conservative limits could be required by
the DSO to run a market an hour ahead of the TSO, and two hours
ahead of delivery, due to uncertainty over output from DERs. To
address this uncertainty, probabilistic methods could be employed
to ensure that the DSO maintains network stability for a range of
possible input scenarios.
The German Association of Energy and Water Industries’ ‘traffic
light’ concept [16], provides a framework for DSO-TSO coordi-
nation. In the ‘green’ state of the traffic light concept, DERs can
participate directly in the TSO market, in the ‘amber’ state, a DSO
marketplace resolves constraints, and in the ‘red’ state, the DSO
intervenes directly to prevent violations. The main contribution of
this paper is the novel implementation of a DSO-TSO balancing
market coordination model, to resolve the ‘amber’ state in the traffic
light concept.
The DSO-TSO balancing market coordination model proposed
in this paper, is demonstrated on a constrained distribution network
in GB, under a future high DER growth scenario. The objective of
the market coordination is to achieve the most efficient dispatch of
DERs (e.g. PV, Wind, EVs and batteries) to minimise system costs
(balancing and reinforcement) at both distribution and transmission
level.
The model has the advantage of being compatible with existing
transmission balancing markets, without the need for a complete
system redesign. The existing GB transmission level balancing
mechanism operates from 1 hour ahead of delivery (known as ‘gate
closure’), when the TSO takes bids and offers from all participants
to adjust output. The TSO takes redispatch actions, which are paid as
bid, to balance supply and demand and to relieve transmission con-
straints. In the proposed coordination scheme, the DSO market will
clear ahead of the TSO market and provide adjusted DER limts and
set points to the TSO at gate closure.
In the authors’ implementation, the DSO balancing market is used
to solve distribution congestion, while setting limits to participation
of DERs in the TSO balancing market. This ensures that instructions
to DERs from the TSO do not violate constraints (e.g. exceeding
thermal and voltage limits) at distribution. To integrate the proposed
coordination model, there is no requirement for major changes to
existing TSO balancing market operation. The main possible effect
could be an increase in the number of DER participants, with a
resultant computational burden placed on the TSO.
To deal with the growing number of smaller DERs participating in
the GB balancing mechanism, the TSO (National Grid) added a dis-
tributed resource desk in January 2019. Historically, the TSO passed
bid/offer acceptance instructions manually, tending to favour larger
units that can provide flexibility with a minimum number of instruc-
tions. Increased use of automation and optimisation techniques will
likely be required by the TSO to access flexibility from an increasing
number of DERs.
As far as possible, real demand, price and generation data has
been used in simulations, to more accurately predict the requirement
of the DSO and TSO for flexibility. The work reported here goes
beyond the existing literature by giving results of DSO-TSO inter-
action, and shows how the sharing of flexibility between DSO and
TSO can be coordinated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the state of the art in DSO-TSO coordination, Section 3 out-
lines the DSO-TSO balancing market coordination model proposed
in this work, Section 4 describes case studies used to demonstrate
the model, Section 5 presents a discussion of results and Section 6
contains conclusions.
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2 DSO-TSO Coordination
This section reviews the state of the art research into DSO-TSO
coordination, beginning with a focus on the GB electricity system,
followed by a review of academic literature and finishing with a
summary of the latest work in developing the traffic light concept.
2.1 DSO market development in GB
The motivation behind a DSO market is to provide a lower
cost alternative to network reinforcement triggered by the growth
in DERs. Under GB price control regulations, known as RIIO
(Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs)[17], DSOs are encour-
aged to seek alternatives to reinforcement, and their revenues are
not only derived from network upgrades, but also from innovation,
such as the introduction of flexibility markets.
Within the GB system, flexibility markets are already under trial
in most distribution network regions using the Piclo flex platform
[18]. These flexibility markets are predominantly for peak shaving
by reducing demand or dispatching generation at a small number
of peak occurrences, which could otherwise have triggered network
reinforcement. In the initial stages of the Western Power Distribution
(WPD) Flexible Power trial [8], flexibility is procured for a 1-year
contract and prices are fixed, at around £300/MWh depending on the
product, in an attempt to assess the available flexibility and market
liquidity. The WPD market has no exclusivity clause meaning DERs
can offer services to both the DSO and the TSO. In the event that the
DER is not available to the DSO when called upon, the operator of
DER would lose revenue through an ‘underperformance clawback’
[8].
2.2 Academic literature
Much work has been done on modelling DSO markets [7, 19]
and proposing system architectures, including the role of the future
Distribution System Operator (DSO) [5, 14, 20–22]. However, the
literature focusing on models and demonstration on real electricity
networks to achieve TSO-DSO coordination, as carried out in this
paper, is sparse. In [15] different models are proposed with varying
levels of involvement of the future DSO in managing the distribution
networks. In the market DSO approach in [15], the DSO can either
aggregate DERs in response to TSO signals, or carry out all coordi-
nation and aggregation within each local distribution area, providing
the TSO with a single aggregated resource at each T&D interface.
In the SmartNet project [13, 14], several DSO-TSO coordination
schemes are considered including the following:
• Centralised market: the TSO operates the market, the DSO can
be involved in a prequalification stage to ensure the TSO’s
actions do not result in constraints at distribution level.
• Local market: the DSO operates a distribution level market,
aggregates cleared services and transfers them to the TSO
operated market.
• Shared balancing responsibility: the DSO has balancing
responsibility for the distribution grid.
• Common DSO-TSO market: DSO constraints are included in
market clearing. Either in a single optimisation process for
entire T&D system (TSO and DSO jointly operate) or with
separate DSO markets run first.
• Integrated flexibility: TSO, DSO and third parties all bid for
flexibility in a common market.
The various models have a range of strengths and weaknesses
including complexity, compatibility with existing systems and
choice for the DERs as to which market to participate in. The com-
mon DSO-TSO market model has been applied in this work, with
the DSO market run separately. This offers advantages over prequal-
ification in the centralised market and aggregation of resources in
the local market model. Prequalification would mean having to rule
some DERs out of the TSO market in the event of constraints, how-
ever with a DSO market they can be dynamically compensated when
this occurs. Aggregation of resources by a local market operator is
not straightforward and requires an aggregated supply curve to be
calculated by the DSO for multiple DERs, this was investigated and
found to be computationally expensive. Shared balancing responsi-
bility requires the DSO to balance supply and demand at the T&D
interface which may reduce the TSOs access to DERs. The focus
of the DSO should be on congestion management and the flow over
the T&D interface should be left for the TSO to optimise. Integrated
flexibility applies a level playing field for access to DERs, however
does not account sufficiently for distribution constraint management
which will become increasingly important with the growth of DERs.
In [14] the co-ordination schemes are described for the provision
of ancillary services, however they can be applied to system bal-
ancing, as demonstrated in [20]. The common DSO-TSO model in
[20] is decentralised, with the DSO market cleared first. A ‘resid-
ual supply’ function is calculated based on the change in cost with
a change in power flow between T&D. This allows the TSO to opti-
mise and pass instructions back to the DSO. In [22], distribution is
first optimised then the communication between T&D is carried out
using a ‘generalised bid’ function, a similar concept to the resid-
ual supply function, which represents the marginal cost of power
generation from distribution. The method used in this work offers
an alternative to the DSO aggregating DERs and calculating supply
or bid functions, which can be computationally expensive to imple-
ment. The method of this paper allows DERs to participate directly
in the TSO market with the DSO adjusting the bounds of DERs to
prevent constraints.
A distribution market model is presented in [7] along with a liter-
ature review of some of the other works into DSO markets. In [7] the
dispatch is calculated centrally which does not represent GB market
operations. In a comprehensive study of the co-optimisation of T&D
markets [19], locational marginal prices are calculated, both at T&D,
using a mixture of centralised and decentralised optimisation.
In the work described in this paper, dispatch positions are
assumed to be set ahead of the DSO balancing market (e.g. as a
result of forward, day-ahead and intraday markets). In the authors’
implementation of the ‘traffic light’ concept, the DSO clears a local
balancing market first, activating flexibility to remove any distribu-
tion network congestion (in the ‘amber’ state). With the congestion
removed (the ‘green’ state), any remaining flexibility is available for
participation in the TSO market. DERs are not aggregated into the
TSO market by the DSO and can participate directly in the TSO mar-
ket after the DSO market has cleared. The bidding behaviour of the
DERs, network congestion and resulting DSO-TSO market prices
will dictate which market they are activated in.
2.3 Traffic light concept
The ‘traffic light’ concept has been discussed in several other works
including: [5] where DSO-TSO cooperation in each system state
(green/amber/red) is considered but not demonstrated; [23] and [24]
where implementations are outlined without any test case demon-
strations; [25] and [26] where implementations are demonstrated at
LV but with limited consideration of DSO-TSO interaction.
The work presented in this paper aligns most closely with [27],
where a local flexibility market model (described in more detail in
[28]) is designed, and uses the traffic light concept. A Balancing
Responsible Party (BRP) is modelled, with a balancing position in
the TSO market, which competes with the DSO for DER flexibility
(provided via an aggregator). In [27] distribution network constraints
are not modelled, thereby simplifying DER participation outcomes
in the TSO markets. The work presented in this paper extends this to
explicitly account for distribution constraints and a balancing market
representation is provided to relieve these constraints.
This paper will focus on markets for active power balancing ser-
vices, however, it is acknowledged that DSO markets for ancillary
services such as reactive power, as trialled in the Power Potential
project [11], as well as markets for inertia and black-start (amongst
others) could become important in the future.
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the traffic light style DSO-TSO coordination framework.
3 DSO-TSO balancing coordination model
In this section, a mathematical formulation is presented for the DSO-
TSO balancing market coordination model. By presenting scenarios
on a distribution network, this work aims to demonstrate occurrences
of the DSO and TSO objectives competing for the flexibility offered
by DERs, and show how the model prioritises the DSO and TSO
objectives. The model formulation is presented along with a case
study on a distribution network in the south west of England.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Let us consider a distribution network consisting of a set of demands,
D, and a set of DERs, G, connected to this distribution network.
DERs can be generation, batteries or demand side response (DSR).
In this work, upward DSR means turning down demand, which has
the same effect as turning up generation. The real power demand at
bus d is denoted by PDd and the set-point of a DER connected at bus
g is denoted by PGg . Let p
↓
g and p
↑
g denote the downward and upward
re-dispatch variables from the given DER set-point, respectively. The
re-dispatch variables are bounded by the DER lower bound, PLBg , and
upper bound, PUBg , parameters. The DER upper and lower bounds are
key decision variables for the DSO in the proposed framework, the
DSO can adjust these limits to prevent actions by the TSO caus-
ing constraints at distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 4 and
described in more detail in Section 3.2. Note: the bounds can either
be the physical capacity of the DER, or what a DER offers to the
market at any given point in time.
The overall objective function of the DSO balancing optimisation
is given as follows:
min
∑
g∈G
(
C↓gp↓g + C↑gp↑g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of balancing
+
∑
d∈D
VDd
(
PDd − pDd
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of load shedding
(1)
where C↓g and C↑g are bids and offers from the g-th DER, respec-
tively. The parameter VDd denotes the value of lost load at demand d,
and the variable pDd denotes the demand delivered at demand bus d.
The re-dispatch variables are decision variables along with the deliv-
ered demand.
The DER constraints are modelled as follows:
pGg = P
G
g +
(
p↑g − p↓g
)
, (2a)
p↑g ≥ 0, p↓g ≥ 0 (2b)
The RHS of (2a) models the re-dispatch of DERs and pGg rep-
resents the adjusted set point. In addition to the constraints in (2a)
to (2c), the following constraints are implemented, reproduced from
[29]: ∑
g∈Gb
pGg =
∑
d∈Db
PDd +
∑
b′∈Bb
pLbb′ +G
B
b v
2
b , (3a)
∑
g∈Gb
qGg =
∑
d∈Db
QDd +
∑
b′∈Bb
qLbb′ −BBb v2b , (3b)
pLbb′ = v
2
bGbb
+ vbvb′(Gbb′ cos(θb − θb′) +Bbb′ sin(θb − θb′)),
(3c)
qLbb′ = −v2bBbb
+ vbvb′(Gbb′ sin(θb − θb′)−Bbb′ cos(θb − θb′)),
(3d)
θb0 = 0, (3e)
vLBb ≤ vb ≤ vUBb , (3f)
P LBg ≤ pg ≤ PUBg , (3g)
QLBg ≤ qg ≤ QUBg , (3h)
pLbb′
2
+ qLbb′
2 ≤ (Smaxbb′ )2, (3i)
where Gbb′ and Bbb′ are the line conductance and susceptance
respectively. Equations (3a)–(3b) are Kirchhoff’s Current Law gov-
erning real and reactive power balance, (3c)–(3d) are Kirchhoff’s
Voltage Law, (3e) fixes the phase angle to zero at the arbitrary ref-
erence bus, (3f)–(3h) are constraints on voltage, real and reactive
power generation respectively, and (3i) is the line flow constraint.
The above formulation is implemented using an open-source
power systems simulation tool (OATS) [30] and the resulting non-
linear optimisation problems are solved using an open-source solver
(ipopt) [31].
3.2 Framework
In Figure 3, a framework is presented that makes use of the problem
formulation in a traffic light style DSO-TSO coordination scheme.
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The distribution system is balanced based on the market positions of
all DERs along with the anticipated demand for a settlement period
(which in this work is 30 minutes). The DSO market runs before the
TSO balancing market, to integrate with current operating practise.
In the GB system for example, this is currently more than 1-hour
ahead of delivery. On this basis, there will be uncertainty over out-
put from DERs, which has not been fully captured in the model
formulation at this stage.
The first stage is for the DSO to check the feasibility of possible
market outcomes, by taking the positions of all DERs and demands,
along with the upper and lower bounds of the flexible DERs. The
DSO also takes bids and offers from flexible DERs to move down or
up from their respective positions within the limits of the bounds pro-
vided. In this work the bid and offer prices, C↓g and C↑g , for the DERs
are the same in both the DSO and TSO markets for ease of com-
parison, however they could be priced differently for each market.
The DSO must keep sufficient headroom for DERs with ancillary
service contracts (such as frequency response) during their tendered
availability windows.
The DSO market then clears using ACOPF (AC Optimal Power
Flow) driven by OATS [30] to determine any network constraints
for all DERs at their upper bounds and at their lower bounds. The
objective function of the optimisation (1) is to minimise the costs of
adjustments required to remove any network constraints.
3.2.1 Green state: If there are no constraints for the submitted
upper and lower bounds of DERs, there will be no need for adjust-
ments and the cost will be zero. There is no cost for import/export
to the transmission system, which will make up any shortfall or take
any excess generation from the distribution system, within network
limits.
The DERs can then participate directly in the TSO market, offer-
ing any flexibility within the bounds as cleared by the DSO. This is
considered the ‘green’ state where any actions by the TSO will not
cause constraints within distribution.
3.2.2 Amber state: If the DSO requires adjustments to be made
to PLBg , PUBg or PGg for any of the DERs due to network constraints,
this is considered the ‘amber’ state. The DSO market is initiated
to resolve these network constraints, by making adjustments to the
bounds based on the minimisation of (1). In the timeline for the
DSO market clearing in the amber state (Figure 4), the DSO receives
physical notifications (including PLBg , PUBg and PGg ) from the DERs,
2 hours ahead of delivery. The DSO has an hour to manage net-
work constraints and provide any modified positions and bounds to
the TSO at gate closure, 1 hour ahead of delivery. The DSO can
concurrently check both the upper and lower bounds, UB and LB
respectively, by setting PGg to PUBg and PLBg respectively for all DERs,
as shown in Figure 4. If any adjustments are required to maintain the
network within thermal and voltage constraints (outlined in (3a) -
(3i)), for all DERs either at their upper or lower bounds, the DSO
then tightens the original bounds for DERs participating in the TSO
market. This returns the network to the ‘green’ state and the DERs
now participate directly in the TSO market, within the new limits set
by the DSO, without causing constraints at distribution level.
3.2.3 TSO balancing market modelling: In this work the
transmission system is not modelled in any detail due to the com-
plexity of modelling balancing actions for the GB transmission
network. The transmission system, or wider grid, is represented by
a single bus with a generator representing import or export to the
grid, as shown in Figure 5. After DSO market clearing, the distri-
bution system demand,
∑
d∈D p
D
d , is aggregated to the transmission
bus and DERs are added to the transmission bus as individual units
with values of PLBg , PUBg cleared by the DSO.
40 MW
T
D
60 MVa 60 MVa
DGs
60 MW20 MW
N-1 Limit: 60 MVa
Transmission
Distribution
60 MVa 60 MVa
DGs
0 MW60 MW
N-1 Limit: 60 MVa
1 MW
Demand 
Growth
DERs
෍
𝑑∈𝐷
𝑝𝑑
D
Grid
CT↓ = -CIMB
CT↑= CIMB
P𝑇
P𝑔
G
P𝑔
UB , P𝑔
LB
C𝑔
↑
, C𝑔
↓From 
multiple
DSOs
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The transmission import/export flow, PT , makes up the differ-
ence between total DER positions (
∑
g∈G p
G
g ) and total demand
(
∑
d∈D p
D
d ) at distribution after DSO market clearing, including
losses, thus;
PT =
∑
g∈G
pGg −
∑
d∈D
pDd + Losses (4)
where PT is bounded by the secure (N-1) transmission transformer
capacity.
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Lower bounds
Upper bounds
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For all 
DERs
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UB
P𝑔
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↑ ;
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LB = P𝑔
G+𝑝𝑔
↑
• DSO pays C𝑔
↑𝑝𝑔
↑
Fig. 4: DSO amber state timeline: upper and lower bounds adjustments. T is delivery, i.e. T-2 is 2 hours ahead of delivery.
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The TSO market operates with the same objective function as the
DSO market (see (1)). A DCOPF balancing model could be suffi-
cient for the TSO, due to lower losses and voltage variation. DSO
market participants are not expected to cover line losses which are
included in PT . The DSO balancing market is primarily for conges-
tion management, line losses would be part of use of system charges
and not paid by DSO balancing market participants.
There is no cost to the adjustment of PT to balance generation
and demand in the DSO market, however, in the TSO market, any
change to PT comes at the upward, CT↑, or downward, CT↓, cost
for increased or decreased grid import respectively.
In this model, any actions by the TSO market will be purely
for arbitraging the cost of adjusting grid import/export, CT↑/CT↓,
against the cost of adjusting DERs, C↑g /C↓g . Negative costs represent
payments to the TSO, therefore if CT↑ or CT↓ are negative, the TSO
could profit by increasing or reducing PT . However, to maintain bal-
ance of supply and demand, any adjustment to PT must be balanced
by a change in DER output PGg with corresponding cost, C
↑
g or C
↓
g .
For the TSO to carry out arbitrage, any income for the TSO from
the adjustments to PT must be greater than the cost of re-balancing
by adjusting DER output. It is not suggested that the primary objec-
tive of the TSO in a balancing market is for arbitrage, in this work
arbitrage represents occasions when the TSO would have a demand
for DERs in system balancing. The transmission network could be
modelled in more detail to include balancing actions by the TSO,
however this is outside of the scope of this work.
The grid import/export cost is represented by the 2018 GB imbal-
ance price (CIMB) from [3]. The imbalance price is the cost to the
TSO of correcting system imbalance between supply and demand
and does not include balancing actions due to network constraints.
The system imbalance price is used in this work to show the value
of DER flexibility for a range of balancing prices, although in real-
ity, accepted DER actions could be part of the imbalance price
calculation. Some expected market outcomes are outlined below;
• At times of high imbalance price, DERs will be turned up. The
transmission bid price, CT↓, equals−CIMB, therefore, at times
of high positive CIMB, when DERs have offer prices (C↑g) lower
than the CIMB, the DERs will be turned up and TSO import
PT can be turned down. The TSO will profit by the differ-
ence between CIMB and C↑g . Therefore upward availability will
be rewarded at times of high imbalance price. Highly positive
prices represent periods when the market is short and the TSO
pays a premium to reduce power flow to distribution.
• At times of highly negative imbalance price, DERs will be
turned down. The transmission offer price, CT↑, equals CIMB,
therefore, when DERs have bid prices (C↓g) lower than -CIMB
(in the case of a negative imbalance price), the DERs will be
turned down and TSO import (PT), will be turned up. The TSO
will profit by the difference between -CIMB and C↓g . However
this is only in the case of negative CIMB which will result
in a negative CT↑, or in the case of negative C↓g from the
DERs, either of which can result in income for the TSO for
arbitrage. Highly negative prices represent periods when the
market is long and the TSO will pay to increase power flow to
distribution.
In the following sections, the DSO-TSO balancing market coordi-
nation model developed in this section, is demonstrated on a GB
distribution network.
4 Case Study: South-West of Cornwall
Part of the distribution network in Cornwall in the south west of
England, is used to demonstrate the application of a traffic light style
system to coordinate separate DSO and TSO balancing markets. The
modelled network is illustrated in Figure 6.
Network data is taken from the long term development statement
of the DSO [32]. The network model contains a single 400 kV trans-
mission bus, connected to a ring of 132 kV distribution network.
GSP (400 kV)
RAME1  
160-163 BSP (132 kV)
400 kV
132 kV
Generator
INDQ1
135
FRAD1 
126-129
CAOR1 
107/108
HAYL1 
133/134
Transformer
Node
SAUS1S
164-166
INDQ41 
587
33 kV
Primary (33 kV)
MULL3
231
WHRH3
244
HELS3
222
CONS3J
215
BICK3J/K
215/6
PENR3J
236
FALD3
217
RAME3
204
SKEV3
240
LANN3J/K
225/6
GOON (WF)
20 MW
GHIL (PV)
12 MW
EfW
24 MW
STDE
173
ROSK 
(PV)
18 MW
PENF(PV)
18 MW
TRUR1  
184/185
HAYL3
195
CAOR3
187
TRUR3
212
FRAD3
187
SAUS3
296
XXX – Bus number
Fig. 6: Schematic of Cornwall network used for DSO balancing
study, EfW - Energy From Waste Plant, WF - Wind Farm
Six bulk supply points (BSPs: substations with transformers which
step voltage down from 132 kV to 33 kV) within Cornwall are mod-
elled: Rame, Hayle, Camborne, Truro, Fraddon and St Austell. For
all BSPs except Rame, demand and generation are aggregated to the
bus on the 33 kV side of the BSP transformers. BSP transformer
constraints are therefore included in the model, and are used to cal-
culate the firm and reverse capacities in Tables 1 and 2. At Rame, the
33 kV network is modelled (see Figure 6), and demand and genera-
tion are lumped to the 33 kV side of the eleven primary (33 kV / 11
kV) substations.
The Cornwall network allows the traffic-light style coordination
system of this paper to be demonstrated. Distribution constraints
are resolved by a DSO, and DER bounds, for participation in a
TSO market, are qualified. The competition for procuring flexibil-
ity, between the DSO and TSO, is explored in a highly constrained
region. Tables 1 and 2 describe existing peak demand and embedded
generation characteristics of the network, as well as how these char-
acteristics may change under a modelled 2030 scenario prescribed in
the National Grid Future Energy Scenarios (FES) [1]. The particular
FES scenario that was modelled, known as Community Renewables
(CR), has a large uptake of renewables (wind and PV) at distribution
level along with high levels of EV and heat pump integration. The
CR scenario was chosen to assess the need for a DSO market with
the highest anticipated levels of DER.
.
Table 1 Cornwall bulk supply point demand headroom current and 2030 Commu-
nity Renewables scenario, MVA; data: [1, 32].
BSP Firm
Capacity1
Peak
Demand
Demand
Headroom2
2030 Peak
Demand3
2030
Demand
Headroom
Rame 105 72.3 32.7 94.8 10.2
Hayle 60 61.2 -1.2 73.5 -13.5
Camborne 180 43.5 136.5 52.3 127.7
Truro 60 60.4 -0.4 79.2 -19.2
Fraddon 120 74.1 45.9 97.1 22.9
St Austell 90 61.6 28.4 74 16
1 Firm capacity is based on (N-1) secure transformer capacity for grouped demands
greater than 60 MW. For example, the firm capacity for Truro is from one of the two
Truro BSP transformers, due to grouped demand being above 60 MW. This is a sim-
plified approximation of the P2/6 security of supply recommendation [33] which is the
distribution security standard in GB.
2 Headroom is calculated from Firm Capacity - Peak Demand (as in [34]). This does not
include minimum embedded generation which would increase demand headroom.
3 2030 Demand Estimate for Community Renewables scenario [1].
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Table 2 Cornwall bulk supply point generation headroom, current and 2030
Community Renewables scenario, MVA; data: [1, 34].
BSP Reverse
Capacity1
Gen
Capacity
Gen
Headroom2
2030 Gen
Capacity2
2030 Gen
Headroom
Rame 73 59.1 13.9 271.7 -198.7
Hayle 60 51.3 8.7 106.6 -46.6
Camborne 67.7 23.5 44.2 98.8 -31.1
Truro 60 82.9 -22.9 278.1 -218.1
Fraddon 120 162.5 -42.5 280.5 -160.5
St Austell 68.6 47.3 21.3 170.7 -102.1
1 Reverse capacity is based on (N-1) secure transformer reverse capacity for grouped
demands greater than 60 MW. For example, the reverse capacity for Rame is from two
of the three Rame BSP transformers, due to grouped demand being above 60 MW.
2 Headroom is calculated from Reverse Capacity - Gen Capacity (as in [34]). This does
not include minimum demand which would increase headroom; thermal and voltage
constraints are modelled in the ACOPF within the Rame 33 kV network, but ignored in
the other BSPs.
3 2030 Generation Estimate for Community Renewables scenario [1].
The capacity of each generation and flexible demand technology
included in the 2030 model is shown in Table 3. Demand profiles are
based on measured BSP flows from [3] for the year 2017 for an area
with minimal embedded generation. Projected deployment of EVs
and heat pumps, under the 2030 CR scenario, were then added to the
baseline BSP demand profile, to create the 2030 demand profiles.
Generation profiles for PV and Wind are from the Renewables Ninja
[35] resource using 2016 data.
Table 3 Cornwall generation and flexible demand by technology1, 2030 Commu-
nity Renewables scenario MW; data: [1], [32].
BSP PV Wind Firm2 Battery DSR3
Rame 195.8 59.0 16.9 2 19.5
Hayle 47.2 22.2 37.2 0 4.4
Camborne 74.2 22.6 2 0 8.8
Truro 183.7 86 4.4 4 18.8
Fraddon 181.4 80.2 14.9 4 22.7
St Austell 115.2 30.1 21.4 4 12.4
1 2030 Community Renewables gives estimate for total PV, wind, firm and battery within
the Indian Queens grid supply point (GSP). New generation is assigned to BSPs within
the GSP region based on existing distribution of technologies.
2 Firm generation is modelled as always available and includes biomass, energy from
waste and diesel.
3 DSR (Demand Side Response): All new EV and heat pump demand under the 2030 CR
scenario is modelled as available for DSR with downward flexibility. These values are
the peak values but will vary with instantaneous demand.
4.1 The cost of flexibility
A key component of modelling the DSO and TSO balancing markets
is the assumed bid and offer prices of the DERs to provide flexibil-
ity. There is a high uncertainty around predicting prices of electricity
and flexibility in 2030. Within this case study, 2018 price data for
both ancillary services and the National Grid Balancing Market,
described in Tables 4 and 5 respectively, were used as a guide to
represent two price cases. The two developed price cases are:
1. Cheap demand side response (DSR): where demand side
flexibility is cheaper than curtailment of renewables and
2. Cheap Curtailment: where it is cheaper to curtail renewables
than to flex demand.
Specific price data for each of these cases is outlined in Table 6.
The positive prices in Table 6 ensure that the DSO (whose objective
function is represented by (1) will not carry out balancing actions
for any other reason than network constraints. There is no cost to
the DSO on import/export to transmission which introduces a poten-
tial problem of the DSO using DERs for arbitrage. The DSO would
profit from turning down any DERs with negative bids (negative bids
represent payment to the DSO), with no cost for increased import
from transmission. This could be particularly problematic if the TSO
had a shortage, which the DSO could exacerbate by turning down all
DERs with negative bids, to profit from arbitrage. If all bids and
Table 4 GB Average cost of ancillary services; data: [2].
Service Average Utilisation
Price (£/MWh)
Year
Demand Turn-Up 65 2018
Short Term Operating
Reserve (STOR)
142 2016
Table 5 GB volume weighted average cost of 2018 National Grid BM actions by
technology; data: [3].
Technology Bid1(£/MWh) Offer2(£/MWh)
Demand Side3 -584 28
Gas -42 85
Coal -47 83
Hydro -14 104
Pump Storage 1 114
Biomass 8 73
Wind 73 -
1 Bid to Turn-down Generation/Turn-up demand. In the GB balancing mechanism,
negative bids are payments by the TSO whereas in this study negative bids are
payments to the TSO for consistency with the model.
2 Offer to Turn-up Generation/Turn-down demand.
3 Data for Aug 18 - Jan 19 for aggregator volumes shown in Figure 1. It is assumed
that aggregators represent demand side (they are registered as supplier type BM
units), however they may include embedded generation.
4 A negative bid means on average the aggregated BM units are paying to turn
down generation/turn-up demand, this indicates embedded generation (e.g. diesel
generator) with a fuel cost saving.
Table 6 DER pricing: Cheap curtailment and Cheap DSR cases 1
Cheap Curtailment Cheap DSR
Technology Bid Offer Bid Offer
Wind 10 20 60 20
PV 10 20 60 20
Firm2 2 20 20 20
Battery 70 70 70 70
Mixed3 5 20 40 20
DSR4 60 70 10 30
1 The prices in Table 4 and 5 are used as a guide for setting the DER price
cases.
2 Firm generation includes biomass, energy from waste and diesel. They
may be willing to turn down at low cost due to fuel savings.
3 Aggregated mixed technology balancing units from lower voltages.
4 Demand Side Response (DSR): flexibility from heat pumps and EVs.
offers are positive, the DSO will pay for any adjustments to DER
positions, therefore preventing arbitrage.
The ‘Cheap DSR’ case is more desirable in terms of minimising
curtailment (and utilising low carbon generation), however, it could
be cheaper to curtail generation at times of maximum output than to
flex demand. Hence, the ‘Cheap Curtailment’ case is modelled for
comparison.
5 Results and Discussion
The following scenarios are analysed on the Cornwall network
(Section 4), using the DSO-TSO balancing market coordination
model for a 24 hour period (with 48 half hour periods);
1. Maximum import to distribution: Maximum demand and
minimum output from intermittent generation (winter day).
2. Maximum export from distribution: Minimum demand and
maximum output from intermittent generation (summer day).
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3. Negative transmission Imbalance Price.
Each scenario is executed using 2030 Community Renewables
demand and generation profiles for the ‘Cheap Curtailment’ and
‘Cheap DSR’ DER price cases as outlined in Table 6.
5.1 Cheap Curtailment
In the ‘Cheap Curtailment’ case, wind, PV and firm generators are
curtailed at lower cost than activating DSR or batteries. The most
interesting results, in terms of both the DSO and TSO accessing
DER flexibility, were observed for maximum import and negative
imbalance price.
5.1.1 Maximum Import: Under the DSO-TSO balancing coor-
dination methodology developed in this work, demand must be met
with all DERs set to their lower bounds, to achieve the ‘green’ state.
If the DSO load flow predicts constraints in the distribution network,
the DSO market is run (‘amber’ state). To return to the ‘green’ state,
the DSO may increase the lower bounds on generation to guarantee
peak demand is met, or use DSR and batteries to reduce the peak
demand.
The maximum import case (see Figure 7), which occurred on a
day of high demand and low DG output, has a peak demand of
approx. 420 MW at 17:30, at a time when solar and wind output
are minimal.
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Fig. 7: Top Plot: Dispatch by DSO and TSO for ‘Cheap Curtailment’ for 24 hour
period of Maximum Import (in January). D and T are used to indicate results of the
DSO and TSO markets respectively. Dotted lines are unmodified positions. UB - Upper
Bound, LB - Lower Bound. Bottom Plot: Transmission Imbalance Price.
At 14:30, the ‘amber’ state (DSO market) is triggered, due to
insufficient import capacity to meet demand with DERs at their
lower bounds. To ensure there is sufficient generation to meet the
peak demand, from 14:30 till 23:00, the DSO pays generators their
offer price to increase their lower bounds (see increase in ‘Gen D
LB’ in Figure 7). Once these lower bounds have been fixed by the
DSO, the TSO cannot reduce generation below these lower bounds
during this period.
Upward DSR (i.e. reducing demand) is used by the DSO between
14:30 and 20:00, as there is insufficient import capacity to meet
peak demand in constrained network areas (Rame, Truro and Frad-
don) during this peak time. The amount of upward DSR available
to the TSO for the two price spikes (£220/MWh and £140/MWh),
at around 18:30 and 19:30, was subsequently reduced due to DSR
being committed by the DSO. The DSO and TSO both wanted
upward DSR during those price spikes, this is an example when the
DSO dispatch aligns with the TSO’s objective.
Truro is the most demand constrained region in Cornwall (see
Table 1) for the 2030 CR scenario. In Truro, during the 5 peak
demand hours of the maximum import scenario (see Figure 8), DSR
was used to its upper limits and generation lower bounds were raised
as far as possible, however up to 2.7 MW of load shedding was still
necessary. The DSO market would quickly highlight the need for
flexibility in this region as a high price would be paid to prevent load
shedding.
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Fig. 8: Dispatch by DSO and TSO for ‘Cheap Curtailment’ in Truro BSP for 24 hour
period of Maximum Import. D and T are used to indicate results of the DSO and TSO
markets respectively. Dotted lines are unmodified positions. UB - Upper Bound, LB -
Lower Bound.
5.1.2 Negative Imbalance Price: Negative imbalance prices
are rare in GB, however they are increasing in frequency due to
low demand and high output from intermittent generation. A 6 hour
consecutive period of negative imbalance price occurred on the 24th
March 2019 and a 9 hour period occurred on the 26th May 2019
[3]. Negative prices are included in this work to represent cases
where the TSO has a requirement to curtail intermittent generation,
which is a common occurrence in GB due to transmission network
constraints [36]. The March negative imbalance price has been mod-
elled with the dispatch from the maximum export scenario where
high renewable output results in a requirement for curtailment (see
Figure 9).
At around 06:00 the DSO enters the ‘amber’ state due to the upper
bounds of generators exceeding distribution network limits. Gener-
ation is curtailed in the DSO market from 06:00 until 16:00, during
this period the upper bounds and set points of the generators are
reduced by the DSO. In the ‘Cheap Curtailment’ case generators pro-
vide the lowest cost reduction in export to return the network to the
‘green’ state.
The curtailment by the DSO coincides with a period of cur-
tailment by the TSO (due to a highly negative imbalance price),
between 10:00 and 16:00. The remaining downward headroom from
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Fig. 9: Top Plot: Dispatch by DSO and TSO for ‘Cheap Curtailment’ for 24 hour
period of negative imbalance price. D and T are used to indicate results of the DSO and
TSO markets respectively. Dotted lines are unmodified positions. UB - Upper Bound,
LB - Lower Bound. Bottom Plot: Transmission Imbalance Price.
the DERs (after DSO market clearing), is used by the TSO for arbi-
trage. This is another case where DSO and TSO objectives align;
during times of high renewables output it is foreseeable that both the
TSO and DSO will have a requirement to reduce output.
In terms of costs, the DSO paid generators to reduce output
whereas the TSO profited from reducing the remaining output using
arbitrage. The former could be seen as increasing balancing costs
and the latter reducing.
5.2 Cheap DSR
In the ‘Cheap DSR’ case the cost of utilising DSR in the DSO bal-
ancing market is lower than that of generation or batteries. In the
maximum import scenario the DSO uses DSR to meet peak demand,
whereas for maximum export, DSR is used to reduce curtailment. In
both cases the TSO uses the remaining DER flexibility for arbitrage.
5.2.1 Maximum Import: The results of the maximum import
scenario (see Figure 10) are very similar for the ‘Cheap DSR’ and
‘Cheap Curtailment’ cases. The only difference is the volume of
DSR used for arbitrage by the TSO, due to the offer price being
£30/MWh in ‘Cheap DSR’ and £70/MWh for ‘Cheap Curtailment’.
The DSO market increased the lower bound of generation dur-
ing peak demand (between 14:30 and 24:00), the same as in the
maximum import scenario for the ‘Cheap Curtailment’ case. The
generators are operating at their upper bounds, therefore increas-
ing the lower bounds does not require set point adjustment in either
cases. The offer price of generation reflects this, at £20/MWh in
both cases. The DSR is operating at its lower bounds (represent-
ing maximum demand), therefore increasing DSR lower bounds
involves increasing the set points which comes at a higher offer cost
of £30/MWh even in the ‘Cheap DSR’ case.
5.2.2 Maximum Export: In the maximum export scenario (see
Figure 11), at 06:00 the DSO enters the ‘amber’ state, i.e. the DSO
market is activated, due to the generator upper bounds breaching N-1
secure transformer reverse capacity limits. DSR and generator (gen-
erator dispatch not shown in Figure 11 to focus on DSR actions)
upper bounds are reduced between 06:00 and 16:00. DSR is used
preferentially due to having a lower bid price. The generators’ output
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Fig. 10: Top Plot: Dispatch by DSO and TSO for ‘Cheap DSR’ for 24 hour period
of Maximum Import (January). D and T are used to indicate results of the DSO and TSO
markets respectively. Dotted lines are unmodified positions. UB - Upper Bound, LB -
Lower Bound. Bottom Plot: Transmission Imbalance Price.
(and upper bound) is reduced, whereas the DSR is operating below
its upper bound, and only has to reduce the upper bound (not its out-
put).
However, the reduced upper bound of DSR by the DSO, comes at
an opportunity cost of reduced upward flexibility available to the
TSO. The TSO can still access remaining upward DSR during peri-
ods of higher imbalance price (i.e. 05:30, 15:00, 16:00, 17:30). This
allowed the DSO to use the most economic source of flexibility to
manage constraints and the TSO to profit from arbitrage. This is an
example of DSO and TSO objectives not aligning, the DSO limiting
the provision of DSR to the TSO due to export constraints.
5.3 Tractability and robustness of proposed method
The tractability of the TSO-DSO coordination model is assessed for
multiple DSOs and larger distribution networks. Different solvers are
compared to assess the robustness of the non-linear programming
(NLP) solver ipopt in producing accurate results of the objective
function (1) compared to other available NLP solvers.
5.3.1 Run-time for Multiple DSOs: The coordination model
has been applied to problems containing multiple DSOs to demon-
strate the scalability of the method. The same distribution network
(Figure 6) was replicated for each DSO, with the total number of
DERs participating in the TSO market increasing with additional
DSOs. The results of computation time for a single timestep for each
DSO and the TSO are shown in Table 7 for between 1 and 4 DSOs.
Simulations were run on a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i6-3770 with 16 GB
of RAM.
The DSO balancing markets are solved independently and in par-
allel prior to the TSO’s gate closure. The computation time per DSO
is therefore equal regardless of the number of DSOs and is based on
the 60 node distribution network illustrated in Figure 6. The model
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Fig. 11: Top Plot: Dispatch by DSO and TSO for ‘Cheap DSR’ for 24 hour period
of Maximum Export (August). D and T are used to indicate results of the DSO and
TSO markets respectively. Dotted line is unmodified position. UB - Upper Bound, LB -
Lower Bound. Bottom Plot: Transmission Imbalance Price.
could be extended to include power flows between DSOs at distri-
bution level, however, this is outwith the scope of this work. The
TSO computation time increases with the number of DERs in the
TSO balancing optimisation. However, the time taken for the TSO
market to clear is significantly less than the DSO market as there is
no transmission network modelled. Practically, the transmission net-
work model would result in a significant increase in computational
time for the TSO, which would also scale with the number of DERs.
Table 7 Computation time for a single timestep for multiple DSOs
Number
of DSOs
Number of
nodes
Number
of DERs
Time per
DSO (s)
Time for
TSO (s)
1 60 62 7 1.10
2 120 124 7 1.60
3 180 186 7 3.23
4 240 248 7 3.70
5.3.2 Run-time for increasing size distribution network: The
distribution model has been extended to illustrate the tractability of
the proposed solution for a larger number of nodes. Table 8 provides
information on the 60, 256 and 1001 node networks studied and their
run times. To produce the 258 node network, a replica section of the
Rame 33 kV network is added to all the primary substations shown
in Figure 6. The 1001 node network was produced by adding a 11 kV
distribution feeder replicated at several secondary substations across
the 33 kV network.
Table 8 Computation time for increased distribution network size
Number of
nodes
Number
of DERs
Time for
DSO (s)
Time for
TSO (s)
60 62 7 1.10
258 225 28 2.20
1001 790 150 5.30
The 258 node network is representative of the size of the entire 33
kV network in the region, and solves in reasonable time. However,
a network which includes 11 kV or below will have tens to hun-
dreds of thousands of nodes. The computational time for the DSO
increases significantly for the 1001 node network, therefore a fast
optimisation technique, such as dual decomposition [37], would be
required for this approach to scale. Increasing the number of DERs
entering the TSO balancing market, for example by decreasing the
minimum entry capacity, will have implications for the TSOs dis-
patch optimisation. New tools will be required for both the TSO and
DSO to handle the vastly increasing problem size if networks are to
be modelled and operated down to lower voltages with more deeply
embedded market participants.
5.3.3 Robustness of the solution: The ACOPF problem being
solved in the model is non-linear and the NLP technique employed
does not guarantee a global optimum solution. To assess the accuracy
of the solver employed in this work (ipopt), results of the objective
function (1) for a single snapshot, are compared using a range of
NLP solvers, for the 60, 258 and 1001 node networks in Table 9.
Results for the 60 node network are almost identical for all 5 NLP
solvers, the maximum percentage difference in objective function is
seen between ipopt and the SNOPT solver of 1.5% for the 258 Node
network. Although these errors are small, it would be desirable to
explore convex relaxation approaches in future applications of this
method to guarantee a global minimum.
Table 9 DSO balancing objective function (1) with selected non-linear
programming solvers
Objective Function (£)
Solver 60 Node 258 Node 1001 Node
Ipopt 332.6 3575.85 6050.31
Knitro 332.99 3581.87 6066.18
Conopt 332.98 3596.88 6061.52
filterSQP 332.98 3589.79 6064.21
SNOPT 332.98 3628.83 6123.85
6 Conclusion
Effective operational coordination of the DSO-TSO interface
remains an area in development for power systems. In this work, the
authors’ implementation of the traffic light concept, has been demon-
strated to provide a simple and effective mechanism to coordinate
DSO and TSO balancing markets.
A novel element of the work is that the DSO clears the DERs’
upper and lower bounds (of active power output) for participation in
the TSO market, to maintain the distribution network in the ‘green’
state (i.e. within network limits). This DSO market provides a mech-
anism to compensate DERs for the opportunity cost of adjusting their
lower and upper bounds in the TSO market.
The main findings for the 2030 representative scenarios modelled,
with high levels of DERs, were as follows;
• The DSO’s actions did not severely limit the access of the TSO
to DERs.
• When the DSO had to access DER flexibility in the DSO mar-
ket due to network constraints, there was flexibility remaining
for the TSO market.
• In most cases modelled, the DSO and TSO objectives were
aligned, however the allocation of costs and benefits of flexi-
bility between them is an area for future work.
This model has been shown to be easily expanded to multi-
ple DSOs feeding into the TSO market or to support competition
between independent ‘aggregators’; the DERs in each DSO region
compete in the TSO market after clearing upper and lower bounds
with the respective DSOs. In this work the DSOs are assumed not to
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be electrically connected, allowing the DSO’s problems to be solved
in parallel.
The DSO was not allowed to benefit from arbitrage in this model,
whereas the TSO market was purely operated for arbitrage. The
results of this study are highly dependent on the prices modelled,
and resulting merit order. Prices have been chosen to illustrate dif-
fering dispatch of DERs depending on price and depending on the
DSO’s and TSO’s objectives.
Coordination schemes are still emerging and with the full
definition of terms just beginning to be developed (e.g. [38]), there
continues to be barriers for DSO-TSO balancing and congestion
management. Uncertainty in renewable generation forecasting will
also have an increasing impact on network balancing. It is likely
that this will require probabilistic methods to account for forecast-
ing uncertainty. It is acknowledged that constraints may be more
likely to occur at LV with the proliferation of EVs and heat pumps
connected at this level. Extending the DSO-TSO balancing market
coordination to LV will pose significant computational challenges
due to the large number of nodes and DERs.
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